In the particular case of Heraclitus, the complexity of the problem of interpretation is compounded by virtue of the stylistic peculiarities of his expression, which is apophthegmatic, logically asyndetic, cryptically symbolic, and haughtily enigmatic. It is not surprising, therefore, that in successive ages Heraclitus has been held up to glory or obloquy as the teacher of a Flowing Philosophy eventuating in irrationalism and mysticism; as the inspirer of Stoicism, conflagration and all; as the avatar of Satan behind the Monarchian heresy (...) of Noëtus; as he who first dimly discerned the Grundeinsicht of Hegelianism; as a Fascist, a Marxist, a Nietzschean, an Existentialist. (shrink)

In this international and interdisciplinary collection of critical essays, distinguished contributors examine a crucial premise of traditional readings of Plato's dialogues: that Plato's own doctrines and arguments can be read off the statements made in the dialogues by Socrates and other leading characters. The authors argue in general and with reference to specific dialogues, that no character should be taken to be Plato's mouthpiece. This is essential reading for students and scholars of Plato.

The mid-century object relations approach saw the category of schizoids as crucial to its own formation. Rooted in a developmental phase where the perception of the mother as a whole and real person had not yet been secured, the schizoid constitution impeded relationships and forced schizoids to communicate through a compliant persona while the kernel self remained isolated. Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Guntrip thought that schizoid features underlay many other pathologies that earlier, Freudian psychoanalysis had misidentified. To correct this, a move (...) to the attachment-oriented theory was necessary, triggering the development of the object relations perspective as a distinct and independent approach. While playing this role in the development of object relations theory, the schizoid category also attracted a note of disapproval. Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Guntrip described schizoids as harmful to society through their everyday actions and through the ideas they propagated. This judgemental nuance highlights an aspect of the alliance between object relations theory and the contemporary welfare state ideology. Culminating in the Beveridge plan, that ideology framed citizenship as comprehensive engagement with society on multiple levels. Citizenship was not just a political activity but also a personally rewarding one, as it allowed expression to each person’s wishes in ways that benefited others. Inability to engage and be rewarded in this way marked obstinate classes and produced rigid and conservative ideologies that opposed the welfare state. Object relations theory described the schizoid condition along similar lines and castigated its consequences for similar reasons. (shrink)

Deborah K. W. Modrak - Aristotle and Other Platonists - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.2 315-317 Lloyd P. Gerson. Aristotle and Other Platonists. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005. Pp. ix + 335. Cloth, $49.95. This book is a heroic effort to defend the thesis that the Neoplatonists' embrace of Aristotle as another Platonist is well grounded in Aristotle's own texts and not a product of Neoplatonic eclecticism. If this (...) case can be made by a comprehensive treatment of Aristotelian texts and attention to the enormous body of secondary literature on the texts discussed, Gerson is determined to make it. The introduction establishes the ancient credentials of the attribution of Platonism to Aristotle and explores the notion of harmony at the heart of Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle's positions. The goal of the Neoplatonic exegete of Aristotelian texts, according to Gerson, is to harmonize what Aristotle says, including his criticisms of Platonic positions, with Platonism. After setting out the central tenets of Platonism as understood by the Neoplatonic proponents of harmonization in the relatively short first chapter, Gerson goes on in the bulk of the work to examine various Aristotelian texts as interpreted by the.. (shrink)

Although "the Socratic method" is commonly understood as a style of pedagogy involving cross-questioning between teacher and student, there has long been debate among scholars of ancient philosophy about how this method as attributed to Socrates should be defined or, indeed, whether Socrates can be said to have used any single, uniform method at all distinctive to his way of philosophizing. This volume brings together essays by classicists and philosophers examining this controversy anew. The point of departure for many of (...) those engaged in the debate has been the identification of Socratic method with "the elenchus" as a technique of logical argumentation aimed at refuting an interlocutor, which Gregory Vlastos highlighted in an influential article in 1983. The essays in this volume look again at many of the issues to which Vlastos drew attention but also seek to broaden the discussion well beyond the limits of his formulation. Some contributors question the suitability of the elenchus as a general description of how Socrates engages his interlocutors; others trace the historical origins of the kinds of argumentation Socrates employs; others explore methods in addition to the elenchus that Socrates uses; several propose new ways of thinking about Socratic practices. Eight essays focus on specific dialogues, each examining why Plato has Socrates use the particular methods he does in the context defined by the dialogue. Overall, representing a wide range of approaches in Platonic scholarship, the volume aims to enliven and reorient the debate over Socratic method so as to set a new agenda for future research. Contributors are Hayden W. Ausland, Hugh H. Benson, Thomas C. Brickhouse, Michelle Carpenter, John M. Carvalho, Lloyd P. Gerson, Francisco J. Gonzalez, James H. Lesher, Mark McPherran, Ronald M. Polansky, Gerald A. Press, François Renaud, and W. Thomas Schmid, Nicholas D. Smith, P. Christopher Smith, Harold Tarrant, Joanne B. Waugh, and Charles M. Young. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminism and Classics:Framing the Research AgendaBarbara K. GoldA landmark conference on "Feminism and Classics: Framing the Research Agenda" was held at Princeton University on November 7-10, 1996; the coorganizers were Janet M. Martin (Princeton University) and Judith P. Hallett (University of Maryland). This conference is the second in a series of more-or-less triennial meetings devoted to feminist research in various areas of classical studies. The first of these conferences (...) ("Feminism and Classics I") was held at the University of Cincinnati in 1992 and was codirected by Kathryn J. Gutzwiller and Ann N. Michelini (both of the University of Cincinnati; for a review of this conference see Clara Hardy and Kirk Ormand, BMCR 4.2 [1993] 135-41).The goals of the Princeton conference were several:mdash To address the evidential deficiencies of the traditional classical literary canon-by examining new kinds of sources and evidence, particularly nonliterary texts and material culture; and by giving increased attention to the ancient Near East and Africa (especially Egypt) as well as to post-classical Greek and Latin texts;mdash To address the methodological inadequacies of traditional historical and philological approaches-by applying the new literary and textual criticism and theory to the traditional classical literary canon as well as to nonliterary and postclassical texts; by adopting comparative approaches to the study of ancient sexuality and gender; and by considering women (in addition to men) as agents in the transmission of the classical tradition;mdash To clarify, illuminate, and evaluate the relations between classical scholarship and the politics of social change-by defining the actual and potential relations among feminist studies, gender studies, and women's studies, and the relation of classical studies to each; by examining the variety of relations that feminist and other scholarship can have to the politics of social change; and by addressing the role of theory in feminist scholarship in classics.The conference was divided into four plenary sessions, each one devoted to a core area of feminist scholarly research in classics: The Historical Recovery of Ancient Women (Speakers: Shelby Brown, UCLA [End Page 328] and Alan Shapiro, University of Canterbury, New Zealand; Discussants: Barry S. Strauss, Cornell University and Sandra R. Joshel, New England Conservatory of Music); Women and the Classical Tradition (Speakers: Joan M. Ferrante, Columbia University and Shelley P. Haley, Hamilton College; Discussants: Diana Robin, University of New Mexico and Judith P. Hallett, University of Maryland); Feminist Literary Studies and the Construction of Sexuality and Gender in the Ancient World (Speakers: David Konstan, Brown University and Barbara K. Gold, Hamilton College; Discussants: Ellen Oliensis, Yale University and Ruth Webb, Princeton University); Feminism and Classics in the Next Century: Feminist Studies, Gender Studies, Women's Studies (Speakers: Peter W. Rose, Miami University of Ohio and Nancy F. Partner, McGill University; Discussants: Sarah B. Pomeroy, Hunter College and CUNY and Amy Richlin, University of Southern California).In addition to the four plenary sessions, there was a rich variety of discussion and presentation in other formats: opening and closing roundtables (including, in addition to some of the speakers and organizers, Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz, Hamilton College, Barbara M. McManus, College of New Rochelle, Bella Zweig, University of Arizona, Kathryn J. Gutzwiller, and Ann N. Michelini, both of the University of Cincinnati); the keynote address by Ernestine Friedl, Duke University; and sixteen interactive workshops, which followed up on the topics of the plenary sessions. These covered topics as broad as "Reading Gender in Epigraphical Text and Context" (Susan Guettel Cole), "The Classical World in Twentieth-Century Historical Fiction by Women" (Sheila Murnaghan and Deborah H. Roberts), "Feminist Theory/Queer Theory" (Kirk Ormand and Rabinowitz), "Politics, Pedagogy, and the Future of Gender Studies" (Mary Whitlock Blundell, Jeffrey S. Carnes, and John T. Kirby), and "Feminist Anthropology and Feminist Work in Classics" (Deborah Lyons).The conference was one of several events celebrating the 250th anniversary of Princeton University. In certain respects it carried on the work of the 1917 Princeton conference organized by Dean Andrew Fleming West. Entitled "Value of the Classics," the 1917 conference was also in its own way interdisciplinary, documenting the impact of classics on such fields as medicine, law, economics, sociology, and public... (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.3 (2001) 401-423 [Access article in PDF] Petrarch and the Genealogy of Asceticism W. Scott Blanchard The morality of thought lies in a procedure that is neither entrenched nor detached. --Theodor Adorno Perhaps no author within or outside of the canon of Western literature wrote as extensively on the topic of solitude as did Francesco Petrarch. While many of our modern associations with (...) the term may find some of their origins traceable as far back as Petrarch's career, the term "solitude" carried with it much different associations in his century than it does for us today, influenced as we are by the Romantic tradition and especially by Wordsworth's absorption with the idea of solitude as an ideal state for self-conscious reflection on the individual's personal history and its meaning. No less than three of Petrarch's major prose works--the De otio religioso, the De vita solitaria, and the Secretum--confront the topic of solitude directly, and we can also point to many letters, poems, and portions of his treatises that either directly or indirectly reflect Petrarch's virtual obsession with solitude. In Petrarch we are confronted with an author who was at once the most politically connected intellectual of his century--we are even tempted to call him a "public intellectual"--and yet who constantly invoked his desire for solitude, for an escape from the many distractions and seductions that the cities and courts of his society offered. For Petrarch these were invariably places where desire lurked and power held sway, so that the life of solitude was often invoked as an alternative--a counter-cultural locus, perhaps--where freedom from temptation and subjection was imagined as an escape from the negotium of worldly life. There is much in Petrarch's writings on the solitary life that is wishful and that we might characterize as merely compensatory in a life that was otherwise quite active and engaged, but there is also a [End Page 401] strain of thought in these works that indicates a certain intransigence beneath Petrarch's overdetermined attachment to the idea, if not the practice, of withdrawal and detachment. An inquiry into Petrarch's idealization of the solitary life may even yield a somewhat reactionary aspect of his complex mind, a conservative strain in an author who was in almost every other way the literary herald of a humanism that was at the center of the cultural avant-garde of the Trecento. Is the Petrarch that in so many accounts of his character is construed as the "first modern man" actually something else, a reluctant ascetic holdover from the Middle Ages? How did Petrarch use his unique understanding of the life of solitude, of ascesis, as a pose from which to construct his sense of himself as an author and intellectual? Or are we simply confronted in the figure of a worldly and an ascetic Petrarch with yet another set of contradictions so appropriate to the "immensely complex" author whose poetic signature was the oxymoron? 1"Asceticism" and "solitude" are of course not synonymous terms, but any examination of a number of Petrarch's works as they fall within what might be called a genealogy of asceticism must recognize from the start that Petrarch's brand of asceticism was somewhat unique, especially insofar as it was deeply influenced by ancient Stoicism as well as by his reading in authors from the early Christian era. The most useful expression for our purposes may be the medieval concept of the "contemplative life," since much of the analysis in what follows will focus on how Petrarch often used his self-proclaimed pose of detachment and withdrawal as a technique for carrying on what were otherwise quite engaged dialogues with those worldly formations of power and authority that are normally conceived of as belonging to the "active" sphere of human existence. 2 For despite Petrarch's participation in or association with a number of political and civic ventures during his long and productive career, he likely never would have freely chosen... (shrink)

Reale points out that the good and the demiurgic intelligence are radically distinct, a conclusion denied by J. Seifert in the last paper of the book. Fourteen characteristics of the idea of the good are listed by T. A. Szlezák. It is obvious, he argues, that the theory of principles of Plato’s unwritten doctrines is not identical with what Republic 6 and 7 say about the good, but there is no real opposition. In the next paper, however, H. W. Ausland, (...) after a sober evaluation of the esoteric teachings, suspects that Reale and Szlezák succumb to a certain romanticism. According to L. Brisson, the good belongs to the sphere of being, even if it is not being ; it is not in every way beyond being. Plotinus was the first to place it above being. M. Erler shows what must be the attitude of the philosopher with regard to the information orally received by him. Although Plato did not want to define the good, he pointed out several of its characteristics. The good, M. Migliori notes, combines in itself beauty, proportion, and unity. The Philebus pursues the doctrine of the Republic and goes into the direction of the unwritten doctrines. The ultimate reality, however, is beyond our understanding. E. Cattanei attempts to explain how for Plato mathematics is a way of access to the knowledge of the good. R. Ferber, on the other hand, stresses that Plato nowhere directly says that the essence of the good is the one. Beauty, symmetry, and truth are not the good itself. According to C. Gill, Gadamer demystified the idea of the good, a view which shows some common ground with the position of analytical philosophy: the good is not a transcendent entity. M. Vegetti, however, upholds the transcendent character of the good as a cause of being. G. A. Press argues that over the past hundred years Plato was considered a dogmatic philosopher, and it was believed that the leading speaker in the dialogues states Plato’s own views, but the situation is far more complex. Plato wants us to acquire a vision rather than propositional knowledge. The idea of the good should not be accorded a special position. C. Rowe tries to demystify some current interpretations, whereas F. Ferrari insists on the causality of the good, and sees Plato’s teaching as the origin of the entire tradition of negative theology. Yet some texts give the impression that the good belongs to the ontological order. C. Porebski reminds us that problems of ethics are the starting point of what Plato says about the good in the Republic. According to F. Trabattoni, Aristotle’s description of Plato’s theory of principles is wrong and his philosophy differs fundamentally from Plato’s. The School of Tübingen is a prisoner of Aristotle’s interpretation. Plato’s reluctance to describe the good in detail may mark the beginning of a skeptic trend in the Academy. The Parmenides tells us, E. Berti says, that one has first to remove all hypotheses before a definition of the Good can be given. E. Moutsopoulos draws attention to some simplistic and wrong qualifications of Plato’s thought as related to idealism and mentions Kant and Hegel’s attitudes with regard to Platonism. J. F. Crosby points to a clear leaving behind of the Socratic “no one knowingly does wrong” in the Alcibiades 216b: as Plato explains in the Protagoras, one may live according to one’s lower appetite or follow the insight of the rational soul. G. Santos makes a strong stand in favor of the identity of goodness and reality. L. P. Gerson examines theories of Platos’s development: there is no evidence of a theory of the form of the good earlier than the Republic. Aristotle, J. Dudley writes, upheld an ethical ideal resembling that of Plato, substituting the contemplation of the unmoved mover for that of the idea of the good. In the last paper J. Seifert argues that Plato identified the demiurge and the good. (shrink)

Sir arthur edington's brilliantly phrased article, “Physics and Philosophy,” which appeared in the January 1933 issue of Philosophy, seems to me to contain a number of things which are calculated to be provocative to the mere philosopher. And I propose in this article to discuss what appears to be one of the most important of these provocative things, namely, Sir Arthur's view of the status of the physical world.

This paper starts from the remarkable habit of yoik singing among the Sámi people and the notion of togetherness in ‘singing together’, being confronted with the role of technology in the contemporary manifestations of ‘singing’. An important link appears to exist between several forms of grooming and the social dimensions of language and singing, as previously shown by Robin Dunbar. These types of interaction surpass the physiological, hormonal and psychological roles of grooming in humans, in non-human primates and in other (...) mammals. For they also determine the constraints of group-forming processes in mammals, and social structures in humans too. The characteristic group size of grooming mammals has been reported to determine the necessity of social stratification. Number constraints therefore form a silver lining throughout this paper. The analogy with artificial language models, and modern language models (MLM) in particular, has been chosen following the suggested applicability of AI for the deciphering of the language of Whales (Cetaceans). The polemic discussion between Noam Chomsky’s so-called classical generative linguistics and propagators of the nonlinguistic MLM approach (referring to Steven T. Piantadosi) is found an instructive heuristic for analyzing the future impact of AI on human culture. It is suggested that AI-generated analogues of ‘singing together’ will profoundly interact (or already do so) with social stratification and with the conservation of human values. (shrink)

Theism is a modern word, meaning belief in God. But there is no unanimity about the attributes of God. The Greek theos meant a superhuman and in particular an immortal Being. For the Platonists he was a “Soul,” and there may be more than one soul. The Christian Fathers—Augustine as well as the Greeks, could say without reproach that God became man in order that man might become divine. The Logos in the Fourth Gospel is God, but not the Godhead. (...) “My Father is greater than I.”. (shrink)

This collection provides a complete version of Shelley's masterpiece Frankenstein as well as her short fiction and letters.

In 1992 M.W. Evans proposed the O(3) symmetry of electromagnetic fields by adding a constant longitudinal magnetic field to the well-known transverse electric and magnetic fields of circularly polarized plane waves, such that certain cyclic relations of a so-called O(3) symmetry are fulfilled. Since then M.W. Evans has elevated this O(3) symmetry to the status of a new law of electromagnetics. As a law of physics must be invariant under admissible coordinate transforms, namely Lorentz transforms, in 2000 he published a (...) proof of the Lorentz invariance of O(3) symmetry of electromagnetic fields. As will be shown below this proof is incorrect; more, after simple correction it will turn out here that the O(3) symmetry cannot be Lorentz invariant. (shrink)

In terms of validity in Kripke frames, a modal formula expresses a universal monadic second-order condition. Those modal formulae which are equivalent to first-order conditions are called \emph{elementary}. Modal formulae which have a certain persistence property which implies their validity in all canonical frames of modal logics axiomatized with them, and therefore their completeness, are called \emph{canonical}. This is a survey of a recent and ongoing study of the class of elementary and canonical modal formulae. We summarize main ideas and (...) results, and outline further research perspectives. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the 1960s, when Dr. Belding Scribner discovered how to accomplish the process of dialysis in a repeated way, he could not imagine that in solving such a problem others as or more difficult would appear. Given the technological progress and the impossibility of assisting all patients through the most modern methods, the medical doctor often finds himself faced with the moral dilemma of choosing which patient in the waiting list will receive the treatment. This same dilemma is amplified (...) in the case of organ transplants. Professionals, students, professors of the juridical and health fields, and the population in general, were interviewed as a means of documenting the moral concepts and opinions surrounding this problem. In the reality in which we find ourselves, it seems to us that deciding who lives, and the responsibility for all the events that culminate in such decisions, is still a subject left open to discussion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.4 (2001) 581-582 [Access article in PDF] Gerald A. Press, editor. Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2000. Pp. vi + 245. Cloth, $63.00. Who Speaks for Plato? contains sixteen essays, each apparently composed specifically for this volume, which challenge what its editor, Gerald Press, identifies as the basic assumption implicit in the "modern" (1) (...) or "traditional" (5) interpretive approach to Plato's dialogues: "that the words and arguments of some character in a Platonic dialogue can be taken to state Plato's (or the historical Socrates') own beliefs and arguments" (5). Throughout the volume this is refered to as the "mouthpiece" theory.The essays in Part I are general methodological pieces, which aim to dismantle the assumptions operative in the mouthpiece approach. So, for example, D. Nails reminds us that "we have no uncontroversial statement from Plato that Socrates is his mouthpiece" (17). Press looks for the hermeneutical argument that would justify "an interpreter in quoting or referring to the words of a named character in a Platonic dialogue and attributing the words or their meaning to Plato as his own opinion," (28), and he finds none in traditional scholarship. J. Waugh and H. Tarrant bring in historical considerations to bolster the antimouthpiece position.The essays in Part II treat individual dialogues, but do so with the general theme in view. E. Benitez offers a brief reading of the Laches, P. C. Smith and R. Blondell take up Book I of the Republic, G. Scott and W. Welton address the Symposium, F. Gonzalez looks at the Sophist and the Statesman, H. Ausland suggests a way of reading the Timaeus. Each aims to disconnect the words stated by the principal speaker of the dialogue from Plato himself.Part III begins with a dissenting view. L. Gerson begins by arguing against using the Phaedrus or the Seventh Letter on behalf of the antimouthpiece view. More interestingly, he describes how "arguments have a life of their own," and as a result are "not character bound" (205). As such, it is permissible, indeed it is incumbent upon the philosophical reader, to attribute arguments found in the dialogues to Plato himself. He concludes his essay thus: "If Plato is intentionally hiding himself, he is a philosopher either with no views or with views diverging from those easily derived from the dialogues." The former alternative Gerson finds "preposterous," the latter "perverse" (210).E. Ostenfeld conceives of Plato's views as in a process of continual development and self-criticism. As a result, he concludes, almost paradoxically, that "everyone" in the dialogues speaks for Plato. In other words, precisely because they were not homogeneous or definitively formulated, a wide variety of characters express the wide variety of views Plato himself held. [End Page 581]J. Mulhern gets the final word in this book, presumably because it was he who coined the phrase "Mouthpiece Fallacy" in a 1971 article. Surveying the literature of the past 30 years, he sees little improvement. In other words, commentators still regularly make the illicit transition between "what an interlocutor says to a similar sentence reporting what Plato says by stating the interlocutor is Plato's mouthpiece" (223).Who Speaks for Plato? is an interesting book that takes up an important issue. Its several hundred footnotes provide a useful guide to the enormous amount of literature on the hermeneutics of the dialogue form.While it is unquestionably valuable, this collection of essays is also frustrating. For the sake of argument, assume that a reader cannot legitimately attribute any views expressed by a character in a dialogue to Plato himself. What, then, counts as the philosophical result of a Platonic dialogue? The volume contains answers like these: Ostenfeld tells us that the dialogues "make us think for ourselves" (212). Nails says that, "The dialogue form provides a means of encouraging readers and listeners to reason dialectically to defensible positions of their own" (16). Waugh adds that the dialogues are "teaching how to philosophize" (49).The problem with these... (shrink)